Peer Reviewed Journals

“Hatchet or Scalpel? Domestic Politics, International Threats, and US Military Spending Cuts, 1950-2014” with Rosella Cappella-Zielinski, 28.4 (2019) Security Studies.

theorizes US defense decision making as subject to constraints and tradeoffs, due to relative domestic interest group configurations. Proposes a framework for understanding defense spending cuts, taking an organizational lens to the strategic and parochial interests and organizations with a stake in the distributional politics of defense spending. Evaluates the relative capacity constraints on the foreign policy executive to cut, not cut, or redistribute existing spending relative to other strategic or domestic concerns.

“What Goes Up, Must Come Down? The Asymmetric Effects of International Threat and Economic Growth on Military Spending” with Rosella Cappella-Zielinski and Benjamin Fordham, 54.6 (2017) Journal of Peace Research.

Questions key assumptions about defense spending, including the idea that variables explaining national differences also explain overtime spending changes, and variables explaining spending increases also explain decreases. We hypothesize that—both across and within cases—growth might not vary inversely with spending (contrary to expectations of defense budgets as Keynesian tools), and that variable (GDP and threat) increases might impact spending increases differently than GDP or threat decline impact spending decreases. We found a differential impact of economic growth/decline on defense spending increases/decreases. We also found no systematic relationship—either increases or decreases—in threat change and spending change, a surprising result, but one that lends support to my overall research agenda that security outcomes are driven by nonstrategic, domestic interests and parochialisms as much, if not more than, strategic or international factors.

 “European Security Strategy and Capability: Enablers and Constraints on EU Power?” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 55.1 (2017), 37-53.

Uses a historical institutionalist framework to theorize military capabilities, proposing that 1) European states are threat-sensitive to international change, 2) this is not always evident in spending changes, but in procurement pattern shifts (from conventional to expeditionary back to conventional), and 3) over time, investments in a particular kind of capability can produce capability constraints at a later stage, when international threat environments shift. 

"Cosmic top secret Europe? The legacy of North Atlantic Treaty Organization and cold war US policy on European Union information policy." European Security 24.2 (2015): 167-182.

Evaluates EU classified information and security clearance policy, addressing how the 21 Century EU adopted US McCarthy-era rules for secrecy and classified information, due to bureaucratic inefficiencies in attempting to mimic NATO standard operating procedures. The consequences resulted in extreme opacity in EU affairs, as well as the accidental adoption of démodé discriminatory personnel policies over sexuality and mental health.

"Who are the Europeans? European Identity Outside of European Integration." JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 52.3 (2014): 650-667.

Questions the assumptions around EU identification, including that identifying as European was associated with support for the EU or expectation of benefits from EU membership. Found evidence that cultural attachment to Europe exists separately from EU support. The implications are that there are multiple possible mechanisms in identifying as European, and at least one is not liberal or cosmopolitan. 'Feeling' European is not necessarily a progressive or cosmopolitan frame, but can be associated with more cultural, historical, or regressive politics. 

 


Book Chapters

“European Military Power: External Threat and Institutional Legacies in EU Defense Cooperation,” with Rosella Cappella-Zielinski, chapter forthcoming in Europe, Russia, and the Transatlantic Divide: Security Relations in Turbulent Times, Mai'a Davis Cross and Pawel Karolewski (eds), University of Michigan Press, forthcoming 2019.

Evaluates how and via what means have European states engaged in formal and informal coordination over arms development and joint purchasing for defense? What explains the patterns over time in this coordination? The paper introduces two theoretical propositions: 1) a neoclassical realist premise that changing threat environments have driven key junctures in EU defense cooperation strategy, institutions, financing, and policy., and 2)  an organizational framework of institutional layering for understanding these strategic patterns over time, which helps explain the domestic and institutional constraints and opportunities of the EU as a strategic actor. Evaluates the development of EU defense cooperation via this combined framework, linking historical and contemporary changes in threat environments and stability in institutional legacies of coordination, including legacies of wartime economic cooperation and informal institutions (WW1, interwar, and WW2) prior to the creation of the common market. 

"The EU’s Response to the Migration Crisis," chapter in Handbook on EU Crisis, Marianne Riddervold, Jarle Trondal and Akasemi Newsome (eds), Palgrave MacMillan, forthcoming 2019

The Foundation of National Security: The Political Economy of Security,” with Rosella Cappella-Zielinski and Norrin Ripsman, chapter in the Oxford Handbook on National Security, Derek S. Reveron, Nikolas K. Gvosdev, and John A. Cloud (eds), New York: Oxford University Press, 2018

 “War Powers, Private Actors, and National Security State Capacity,” Boston University Law Review, Volume 95, Number 4, July 2015.


Other Publications
 

Strategy First: What Price Is Military Superiority Worth?” with Rosella Cappella-Zielinski, article in Policy Roundtable: The Pursuit of Military Superiority, Texas National Security Review, June 2018

“The State of EU Foreign Policy Scholarship,” EU ANTERO Research Network, June 28, 2017.

“European Armaments, Dependence, and Austerity: the Case of Greece and European Arms Contracts,” European Union Studies Association: EU Political Economy Bulletin–Issue 18, Summer 2014.